Following the press conference by the Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBOD) on the losses reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a critical examination of the IMF’s justification is necessary.
In its Country Report No. 26/213, prepared as background for Ghana’s 2026 Article IV Consultation, the IMF attributes Bank of Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme losses to three factors. The Fund states that losses accrued from a combination of factors including “service and assay fees paid to GoldBod, discounts on gold sold to off-takers and exporters, exchange rate losses from the spread between the forex bureau rate paid to purchase gold and the cedi reference rate used for BoG accounting.”
The report elsewhere phrases it as “exchange-rate losses arising from the difference between the forex bureau rate used to purchase gold and the Cedi reference rate used for the Bank of Ghana’s accounting.”
While assay charges and off-taker discounts may be debatable, it is the third factor – exchange rate differentials – that deserves strict scrutiny. This is presented as the major contributor to the reported losses, which the IMF estimates at over $1.7 billion, equivalent to 1.5% of GDP.
What Exchange Rate Differential Means
For the avoidance of doubt, the IMF’s logic is this: GoldBOD buys gold on the field using a higher forex bureau rate, but reports to the Bank of Ghana using the lower BoG reference rate. The difference is booked as a loss on BoG’s balance sheet.
This narrative, however, is inconsistent with GoldBOD’s own published policy.
The Facts on the Ground
GoldBOD has consistently pegged its purchasing rate to the Bank of Ghana rate. Its own directive of 23rd April, 2025 is explicit:
“All persons dealing in gold have also been directed to trade in Ghana cedis and at the Bank of Ghana Reference Rate.”
Its agreement with large-scale miners also states that “the rate of exchange shall be the Daily Interbank FX (Weighted Median) Rate published by the Bank of Ghana.”
As at today, the exchange rate published on GoldBOD’s official website (https://goldbod.gov.gh/) for field purchases is $1 = GHS 11, which is flat with the Bank of Ghana reference rate. If both buying and accounting rates are the same, where does the differential arise?
If GoldBOD is truly buying at the forex bureau rate hovering around GHS 12, then it is short-changing the small-scale miner. At a forex rate of 12, the price of gold per pound today should be approximately GHS 13,000. Yet the prevailing price remains around GHS 12,000, which tracks the BoG rate of 11.
You cannot buy at 11, account at 11, and still declare a loss from a differential between 11 and 12.
Loss Factor or Something Else?
The GoldBOD CEO, Sammy Gyamfi, has firmly rejected suggestions that GoldBOD itself has recorded losses, clarifying that “the IMF’s reported figure relates to accounting assessments concerning the Bank of Ghana’s Gold-for-Reserve programme, and not to the financial performance of the GoldBod.”
That clarification is welcome, but it does not resolve the exchange rate question. If there is no differential in practice, then exchange rate differential cannot be a valid loss factor. It becomes, at best, an accounting misclassification and at worst, a gap that requires forensic audit.
The Bank of Ghana itself has acknowledged that while these accounting losses “partly reflect in valuation effects rather than economic costs, they still weaken the BoG balance sheet.”
Ghanaians deserve to see the ledgers: field purchase receipts showing the rate actually paid to miners, BoG intake vouchers showing the rate at which the same gold was booked, and the reconciliation for Q1-Q3 2025.
Until those documents are published, the claim that exchange rate differentials drove $1.7 billion in losses remains unproven and, per the facts at hand, untenable.
