GIVE ACCRA-KUMASI ROAD TO SOLDIERS! – Ghana Military Engineers More Than Capable To Build Express Road -Dr. Humphrey Darkeh Assem
Abstract
The Accra–Kumasi Expressway, Ghana’s most ambitious infrastructure undertaking since independence, stands at a critical juncture. Preparatory works have demonstrated conclusively that the 48 Engineer Regiment of the Ghana Armed Forces possesses the technical competence, institutional discipline, and operational capacity to execute large-scale national infrastructure projects with unmatched efficiency. This article argues that the Government of Ghana should go beyond the current arrangement of engaging the military engineers as mere subcontractors and instead award the entire construction contract for the 198.7-kilometre expressway to the Ghana Armed Forces Engineers Corps. The evidence from the right-of-way clearance exercise completed one week ahead of schedule despite formidable terrain provides a compelling empirical foundation for this policy prescription. Beyond mere capability, the structural advantages of military-led construction offer Ghana a paradigm shift in how the nation approaches strategic infrastructure delivery.
1. INTRODUCTION
On 14 September 2026, President John Dramani Mahama presided over a ceremony at Kwaso, near Ejisu, to receive a 175.6-kilometre cleared right-of-way for the Accra–Kumasi Expressway Project. The corridor had been cleared by the 48 Engineer Regiment of the Ghana Armed Forces in nineteen weeks, one week ahead of the original twenty-week schedule.
This achievement, while framed as a preparatory milestone, carries profound implications for how Ghana should conceptualise the delivery of its flagship infrastructure projects. The military engineers did not merely clear vegetation; they demonstrated an institutional capacity that civilian contractors have, for decades, failed to match in terms of timeliness, discipline, and cost-effectiveness.
The question that must now be asked is not whether the military engineers can build the expressway, but why they should not be given the opportunity to do so entirely. This article advances a straightforward thesis: the Government of Ghana should award the entire Accra–Kumasi Expressway construction contract to the Ghana Armed Forces Engineers Corps.
2. THE EVIDENCE: DEMONSTRATED EXCELLENCE UNDER CHALLENGING CONDITIONS
2.1 The Right-of-Way Clearance: A Case Study in Competence
The clearance of the 175.6-kilometre corridor through terrain described by the President as “virgin forest, crossing rivers and streams” represents a significant engineering and logistical achievement by any measure. The operation involved:
Terrain Management: The corridor traversed parts of the Greater Accra, Eastern, and Ashanti regions, requiring the clearing of dense vegetation and the management of hydrological challenges.
Multi-Ministerial Coordination: The Engineers worked in collaboration with the Ministries of Defence, Finance, and Roads and Highways, demonstrating the institutional capacity to navigate complex bureaucratic environments without sacrificing operational tempo.
Schedule Performance: Completion in 19 weeks against a 20-week target may appear modest, but in the context of Ghanaian public infrastructure delivery where delays of 200% or more are routine makes this represents exceptional schedule performance.
The President’s decision to direct that the 48 Engineer Regiment be engaged as a major subcontractor and his intention to confer a national honour on the unit constitute an implicit recognition that the military engineers have earned a seat at the table. This article argues they have earned the entire table.
2.2 HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
The suggestion that military engineers should lead national construction is not novel in Ghanaian history. In the early decades of the republic, military engineers-built bridges, roads, and critical infrastructure. The Citizen Eye Ghana (CITEG), a civil society organisation, has noted that this capacity has “weakened over the years due to inadequate equipment and logistics rather than lack of expertise”. The 48 Engineer Regiment’s performance on the expressway corridor suggests that the underlying expertise remains intact and merely requires purposeful deployment.
2.3 INTERNATIONAL VALIDATION
The Ghana Armed Forces Engineers Corps has been called upon to assist in international humanitarian missions, most notably the deployment of the 14 Engineer Brigade to Jamaica following Hurricane Melissa in 2025. The mission, which involved rebuilding essential structures, setting up tent cities for displaced persons, and restoring access to hard-to-reach communities, was undertaken as a model of South-South cooperation.
This international deployment serves as external validation of the Corps’ technical competence. Nations do not dispatch engineering units to disaster zones unless those units are demonstrably capable of delivering results under the most challenging conditions. Ghana’s willingness to export its military engineers is a tacit admission of their quality.
3. THE STRUCTURAL CASE FOR MILITARY-LED CONSTRUCTION
3.1 The Discipline Advantage
The fundamental distinction between military and civilian construction lies not in technical skill; both employ qualified engineers but in institutional culture. Military engineers operate within a command structure where:
Accountability is Personal: Delays and cost overruns are not absorbed by layers of subcontractors and consultants; they are attributed to specific commanders.
Round-the-Clock Operations: The military work ethic, as CITEG has observed, is not constrained by the labour practices and profit-maximisation calculations that govern civilian contractors.
Mission Orientation: The objective is completion, not revenue extraction. This distinction, while subtle, has profound implications for project delivery.
The Finance Minister’s assurance that contractors would not face funding delays because an initial $2 billion had been deposited at the Bank of Ghana is welcome. Yet funding availability has never been the sole cause of Ghanaian project failures. The deeper problem is institutional: a contracting culture where mobilisation is followed by disappearance, where variation orders proliferate, and where completion dates are treated as aspirational rather than binding.
3.2 THE COST EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT
CITEG has argued that military-led infrastructure projects can be completed “faster and often cheaper” because of the military’s “round-the-clock work ethic and non-profit orientation”. This assertion merits serious examination.
Civilian contractors in Ghana operate within a system that incentivises delay. Variation orders, renegotiations, and claims for additional payments are not aberrations but features of the contracting landscape. A military engineering unit, by contrast, has no institutional interest in prolonging a project. Its budget is allocated, its mission is defined, and its success is measured by completion.
The counterargument that military units lack the specialised expertise for complex expressway construction is undermined by the very existence of the Engineer Corps’ diverse capabilities. The 48, 49, 50, and 51 Engineer Regiments possess competencies in construction, bridging, and field engineering. An expressway, while technically demanding, is fundamentally a civil engineering project within the Corps’ demonstrated capability envelope.
3.3 THE STRATEGIC ASSET ARGUMENT
Ghana possesses a “highly skilled national asset that is seldom discussed in conversations about education infrastructure”. The same can be said of conversations about road infrastructure. The Engineers Corps represents a permanent, state-owned construction capacity that is currently underutilised.
Every year that the Corps is not deployed on major national projects represents a depreciation of its skills and a waste of its potential. The equipment may age, the personnel may rotate, but the institutional knowledge and capability remain waiting to be called upon.
The current arrangement, in which the 48 Engineer Regiment will serve as a “major subcontractor,” is a half-measure that fails to leverage this asset fully. As a subcontractor, the Regiment will be subordinate to a civilian prime contractor, its schedule dictated by another entity’s priorities, its scope limited by the terms of a subcontract. As the prime contractor, it would operate with the autonomy its demonstrated competence warrants.
4. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS
4.1 “The Military is Not a Construction Company”
This objection confuses form with function. Military engineers are engineers. Their primary purpose may be to support combat operations, but as the Ghana Military Engineers’ deployment to Jamaica demonstrates, they are equally capable of peacetime construction. The distinction between “military engineering” and “civil engineering” is one of context, not capability.
4.2 “The Military Lacks Experience with Expressway Construction”
No institution in Ghana has experience constructing a six-lane, access-controlled expressway, because no such expressway has ever been built. The relevant question is not whether the Corps has built an expressway before, but whether it possesses the foundational competencies; earthworks, drainage, structural engineering, project management that expressway construction requires. The evidence from the right-of-way clearance, combined with the Corps’ broader engineering portfolio, suggests that it does.
4.3 “Procurement Rules Require Competitive Tendering”
The Concession Agreement approved by Parliament establishes Accra–Kumasi Expressway Limited as the concessionaire responsible for “selection of contractors and awards of contract”. The legal framework permits flexibility in contractor selection. Moreover, the President has already directed that the 48 Engineer Regiment be engaged as a major subcontractor; an acknowledgment that military participation is legally and procedurally feasible. Extending this participation to full prime contractor status is a matter of political will, not legal impediment.
5. A Phased Approach to Full Military Leadership
The argument for awarding the entire contract to the military engineers does not require an all-or-nothing policy shift. A phased approach could mitigate risks while capturing the benefits:
Phase 1: Assign the Corps a defined segment of the expressway (e.g., 30–50 kilometres) as prime contractor, with full responsibility for design, construction, and delivery.
Phase 2: Evaluate performance against schedule, cost, and quality benchmarks, comparing the military-led segment with civilian-led segments.
Phase 3: Based on demonstrated performance, progressively expand the military’s scope, culminating in full project leadership for subsequent phases.
This approach respects the complexity of the project while creating a structured pathway for the military engineers to assume the leadership role their capabilities warrant.
6. Conclusion
The Accra–Kumasi Expressway is not merely a road. It is a statement about Ghana’s capacity to execute complex, large-scale infrastructure projects. The 48 Engineer Regiment’s performance on the right-of-way clearance has demonstrated that this capacity exists within the Ghana Armed Forces.
The Government of Ghana stands at a decision point. It can proceed with a conventional contracting model that has, for decades, produced delays, cost overruns, and incomplete projects. Or it can make a bold, evidence-based choice to entrust this flagship project to the institution that has proven under the most demanding conditions that it can deliver.
The military engineers of Ghana are more than capable. They have proven it. The government should act on this proof and award the entire Accra–Kumasi Expressway contract to the Ghana Armed Forces Engineers Corps.
The nation’s first true expressway should be built by the institution that has already shown it understands what “mission accomplished” means.
