The removal of Her Ladyship Justice Gertrude Araba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo as Chief Justice of the Republic of Ghana is nothing short of a constitutional travesty. As a lawyer deeply committed to the defence of the 1992 Constitution and the independence of our judiciary, I cannot stay silent in the face of such brazen disregard for due process, natural justice, and the sanctity of constitutional order.
Relying on the detailed statement by my senior colleague, J. Ayikoi Otoo, lead counsel for the Chief Justice, I set out why this action by the Executive not only violates Article 146 of the Constitution but also sets Ghana on a perilous path towards executive dominance over the judiciary.
1. A Gross Violation of Article 146
The framers of the 1992 Constitution, mindful of Ghana’s history of authoritarianism, crafted Article 146 to protect judicial officers; particularly the Chief Justice; from arbitrary removal. The provision prescribes a clear process: petitions are to be considered by the President, referred to the Council of State, and if prima facie established, submitted to a constitutional committee. The President’s role is circumscribed; he must act strictly “in accordance with” the recommendations of that committee (Article 146(9)).
Yet, in this instance, the President overreached. The petition sought removal in her capacity as Chief Justice alone, and the committee’s jurisdiction extended only to that office. The President’s warrant, however, unconstitutionally extended to her position as Justice of the Supreme Court. That act is not merely irregular; it is unconstitutional. It undermines the doctrine of separation of powers and arrogates to the Executive powers not granted by the Constitution. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Tuffuor v. Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637, any act contravening the Constitution is void, underscoring the supremacy of constitutional provisions over executive actions.
It must be emphasized that the judiciary should be strictly autonomous, serving as the watchdog over both the Executive and the Legislature. Its independence is not optional; it is foundational to the rule of law and the protection of citizens’ rights. Without strict autonomy, the judiciary cannot effectively check excesses by the other arms of government, rendering constitutional safeguards meaningless.
2. Ensuring Proper Autonomy of the Judiciary
The position of the judiciary should be properly autonomous, not just in principle but in functional practice. This requires robust institutional independence, including financial autonomy, administrative control, and freedom from political interference. Any weakening of these safeguards allows executive overreach, threatens the impartial dispensation of justice, and diminishes public confidence in the legal system. Judicial officers must operate free from threats or inducements that could compromise their impartiality.
3. Denial of Due Process and Suppression of Evidence
The Chief Justice was never served with the prima facie findings of the Council of State. This alone rendered the proceedings void for failure to comply with the elementary rules of natural justice. As the Supreme Court held in Republic v. High Court, Accra; Ex parte Salloum (No. 2) [1991] 1 GLR 310, the right to be heard is not cosmetic but fundamental. The Court emphasized that the denial of a fair hearing is a grave procedural irregularity that renders any decision made in such circumstances void.
Equally disturbing is the Committee’s deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. The Auditor-General’s management letter accepted the Judicial Secretary’s explanation of travel and per diem expenses. The Director of Finance further confirmed that such payments followed a 2010 policy. By excluding this evidence, the Committee rendered findings that were perverse and unsustainable in law.
Routine administrative functions, such as staff transfers and judicial promotions, were invoked as grounds for removal. If such trivialities suffice, no Chief Justice can ever exercise lawful authority without the specter of executive retribution.
The Constitution must be amended to make the removal of a Chief Justice more difficult for the Executive, subjecting it only to clear misconduct or ill health, verified either through personal resignation or assessment by medical professionals, and adjudicated by a competent court. This ensures that the position of the judiciary is properly autonomous and safeguarded against political interference.
4. Pending Judicial Review and Executive Contempt
At the time of removal, no fewer than five cases challenging the legality of the process were pending before the Supreme Court. Two petitions were still before the Article 146 Committee itself. Yet, the Executive acted with reckless disregard for these proceedings, trampling upon the principle of judicial finality. The Supreme Court’s own reluctance to expeditiously hear these substantive constitutional matters is deeply troubling. The Constitution is not suspended when litigation is inconvenient. To proceed in the face of active judicial review is an act of constitutional bad faith.
5. A Precedent that Dismantles Judicial Independence
This incident is not about personalities; it is about institutions. By ousting a sitting Chief Justice under such questionable circumstances, the government has sent a chilling message: the judiciary can be subjugated by executive whim.
As scholars of constitutional law have long argued, judicial independence is not a privilege of judges but a right of the people, guaranteeing impartial justice. The International Commission of Jurists underscores that an independent judiciary is essential for the protection of human rights and the fair administration of justice, serving as a cornerstone of democracy.
6. Non-Disclosure of the Committee’s Report
To date, Her Ladyship has not been served with the Committee’s report. How can a citizen; let alone the head of the judiciary; be dismissed without reasons, without findings, and without a formal record? This is alien to both the common law tradition and Ghana’s own constitutional jurisprudence. In Anane v. Attorney-General [2003–2004] SCGLR 1, the Supreme Court underscored the right of affected persons to know the reasons for adverse decisions. That principle has been cavalierly ignored.
7. The Constitutional and Democratic Stakes
This removal represents a dangerous precedent. If a Chief Justice can be removed without due process, with exculpatory evidence suppressed, with pending litigation ignored, and without disclosure of reasons, then every judge in Ghana is vulnerable.
The judiciary ceases to be a co-equal branch of government and becomes an appendage of the Executive. This development violates the spirit of Articles 125 and 127, which guarantee judicial independence, financial autonomy, and protection from interference. Strict judicial autonomy ensures that the judiciary remains the ultimate guardian of constitutionalism, capable of holding both the Executive and Legislature accountable.
8. A Call for National Vigilance
The moment demands vigilance. The unconstitutional removal of the Chief Justice is not merely an institutional matter; it is a threat to the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the protection of every Ghanaian’s rights. I therefore call upon all stakeholders to act decisively:
• The Ghana Bar Association and the wider legal fraternity must speak with one voice in defence of constitutionalism, judicial independence, and the rule of law. Silence in the face of such encroachments will be remembered as complicity and a failure to uphold the principles of justice.
• Civil society organizations and the citizenry must recognize that when the judiciary is captured or weakened, all rights; including fundamental human rights, freedom of expression, and access to justice; are put at risk. Active engagement, advocacy, and monitoring are critical to prevent further erosion of democratic safeguards.
• Parliament must rise above partisan considerations to check executive excesses, ensuring that constitutional amendments or removals of judicial officers are conducted transparently, in strict compliance with the law, and only under circumstances of proven misconduct or ill health verified through lawful procedures.
• The Executive must respect the autonomy of the judiciary and refrain from interfering in judicial processes. The independence of the judiciary is not optional; it is a foundational principle that ensures accountability, impartiality, and adherence to the Constitution.
• The international community, including ECOWAS and other democratic watchdogs, should treat this event as a warning sign of potential democratic backsliding in Ghana. Diplomatic engagement, advisory support, and monitoring mechanisms are necessary to reinforce the principles of separation of powers and judicial independence.
The defence of judicial independence and constitutionalism requires collective vigilance. Failure to act now risks normalizing executive overreach, undermining democratic governance, and eroding public confidence in the rule of law.
Conclusion: A Republic at the Crossroads
Her Ladyship Gertrude Sackey Torkornoo is not fighting to retain an office. She is fighting to defend the Constitution. What has transpired is a travesty of law, an erosion of constitutional safeguards, and a stain upon Ghana’s democratic credentials.
If allowed to stand, this episode will mark the beginning of a dangerous constitutional regression, where judicial independence is sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. The Republic must resist.
For the sake of posterity, for the dignity of the Constitution, and for the protection of every Ghanaian’s rights, we must reject this unconstitutional assault and demand the restoration of judicial integrity.
Charles Owusu Juanah, Esq.
Constitutional Lawyer & Advocate of the Superior Courts of Ghana
References
1. Ghana. (1992). Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. Accra: Assembly Press.
2. Tuffuor v. Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637. Supreme Court of Ghana.
3. Republic v. High Court, Accra; Ex parte Salloum (No. 2) [1991] 1 GLR 310. Supreme Court of Ghana.
4. Anane v. Attorney-General [2003–2004] SCGLR 1. Supreme Court of Ghana.
5. International Commission of Jurists. (2016). Judicial Independence: A Cornerstone of Democracy. Geneva: ICJ. Retrieved from https://www.icj.org
6. Ayikoi Otoo, J. (2025). Statement on the Chief Justice Removal. Accra: Office of Legal Counsel.
7. Brill Academic Publishers. (2016). Judicial Independence: A Cornerstone of Democracy. In: ICJ Compilation. Retrieved from https://brill.com
8. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (n.d.). Good Practices against Corruption and Judicial Independence. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org
